Towards a coherent theory of animal equality

In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory, containing a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements. I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and empathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that both result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism. Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value of biodiversity

Towards a coherent theory of animal equality

In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory, containing a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements. I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and empathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that both result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism. Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value of biodiversity

Animal suffering and human bias

Ng proposes concrete ways to decrease animal suffering on the basis of commonsense economic logic and research in welfare biology. But to reduce animal suffering effectively in livestock farming, animal experimentation or the natural environment we have to become more aware of our pervasive and spontaneous but unreliable intuitive moral judgments. These can generate biases that prevent us from decreasing animal suffering effectively

Born free and equal?: on the ethical consistency of animal equality

This dissertation investigates the possibility of constructing a consistent ethical system that offers clear notions of equality and incorporates an animal ethic. The first part is more meta-ethical in nature, reflecting on notions such as moral intuitions, universalism, consistency and coherence. It demonstrates that moral illusions might exist and offers a method to discover such moral illusions. The second part turns to normative ethics, dealing with principles of welfare, justice and basic rights. It tackles problems ranging from population ethics to non-ideal theory. Finally, the third part moves to applied (animal) ethics, In analogy to optical illusions, I demonstrate that speciesism is not only a kind of prejudicial discrimination but also a moral illusion: an obstinate intuitive judgment that is inconsistent with a coherent system. The third part also tackles the predation problem and the sentience problem in animal ethics. The end result of this work is a pluralist principlist ethical system that can be captured in a metaphor of five moral fingers working together as the moral hand. This moral hand is a constructed, coherent ethical system of five universalized ethical principles based on strong moral intuitions. The thumb represents the principle of universalism, which is a basic ingredient of coherentism, and generates an anti-discrimination rule. The index finger symbolizes a consequentialist welfare ethic, based on the coherence of impartiality and empathy. The middle finger is the mere means principle of a deontological rights ethic: humans (and animals) have a right not to be used as merely means to someone else’s ends. This principle captures a lot of moral intuitions that pop up in famous dilemmas. A fourth principle, the ring finger, refers to the value of biodiversity and adopts some elements of carnism, the opposite of veganism as ideology. This fourth principle solves the predation problem and is coherent with some other moral intuitions. Finally, the little finger represents the principle of tolerated partiality which can be used in some final moral dilemmas. With these five fingers of ethics, we can grasp the moral problem of consuming animal products, and answer the question whether veganism is a moral duty

Unwanted Arbitrariness

I propose a new fundamental principle in ethics: everyone who makes a choice has to avoid unwanted arbitrariness as much as possible. Unwanted arbitrariness is defi ned as making a choice without following a rule, whereby the consequences of that choice cannot be consistently wanted by at least one person. Other formulations of this anti-arbitrariness principle are given and compared with very similar contractualist principles formulated by Kant, Rawls, Scanlon and Parfit. The structure of arbitrariness allows us to fi nd ways to avoid unwanted arbitrariness. The two most important implications of the anti-arbitrariness principle are discussed: non-dictatorship and non-discrimination

On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming

Timothy Hsiao attempts to defend industrial animal farming by arguing that it is not inherently cruel. We raise three main objections to his defense. First, his argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of cruelty. Second, his conclusion, though technically true, is so weak as to be of virtually no moral significance or interest. Third, his contention that animals lack moral standing, and thus that mistreating them is wrong only insofar as it makes one more disposed to mistreat other humans, is untenable on both philosophical and biological grounds